

Chapter 2

The Great Normative Changes of the Twentieth Century

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Given the focus of the present volume on normative morphogenesis, this chapter canvasses some of the great normative transformations of the twentieth century. What were those changes and who or what effected them? These are the basic questions this chapter will address. As a follow-up, it will further ask where these changes leave us now and the extent to which they all cohere within the contemporary condition we have been calling morphogenic society.

What do we even mean by normative change? Well, change in norms – and by extension, values. Values may be clear enough, although difficult to define. “‘Values,’” Anne Swidler (2001) tells us in *Talking of Love*, placing the word within quotation marks lest we mistake it for something real, “are usually seen as the ranking of options on a hierarchy of preferences.”

As I say elsewhere, Swidler’s definition of values is exceedingly thin and emotionally barren, as if lifted from the pages of a treatise on rational choice theory. Not what one would expect from a doyenne of cultural sociology. We hold some values more strongly than others, which is why we have a rich vocabulary for labeling them: commitments, concerns, passions, ideals, interests, and so on. Preferences also is a word we use to label our values, but it is one of the weakest. I more than just prefer that justice be done, that my wife thrives, or that the earth abides. When we speak of values, as Collins (1984) notes, we are speaking about things about which we are emotionally engaged. Values refer to what we love, what we stand for, for what we are willing to sacrifice, even die.

What about norms? Norms are rules, but a certain kind of rules. Whereas in their chapters in this volume, Al-Amoudi (2016) and Lawson (2016) regard all rules as simultaneously regulative and constitutive, I continue to follow Searle (1970) in distinguishing regulative from constitutive rules. In terms of that distinction, the

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norms I will discuss here are all regulative rules telling us how we should behave. That designation, however, remains too broad. The *should* invoked by regulative rules is a mixed bag. There is the *should*, for example, of rationality that enjoins us to avoid contradictions or belief without adequate warrant. That kind of norm will not occupy us. Nor will I be addressing the purely regulative rules without moral valence that Archer (2016) discusses in her chapter in this volume. While along with Archer a number of other contributors to the volume – Donati (2016), Gorski (2016), and Maccarini (2016) – also address what Maccarini calls the neutralization of moral norms, it is norms that remain value-laden that I will be addressing.

Even value-laden norms are a mixed bag. At the bottom of the totem pole perhaps stand rules of etiquette. Arising in their formal guise as rules of gentility that did and still do represent in part markers of social class membership (Elias 1978), etiquette can also be regarded, along the lines of Goffman (1963), as ways of showing deference or respect to others as sacred objects. As such, etiquette certainly does belong to our inquiry, and we will address ourselves here to changes over the twentieth century in the rules of etiquette.

More value-laden are the norms that span the overlap between morality and legality. Not all that is immoral is illegal, and not all that is illegal is immoral. As Donati (2016) tells us in his paper, while most people in the West continue to consider incest immoral, there is a move now in Germany to decriminalize it. Conversely, marijuana-use remains illegal in many places but is not generally considered immoral. Still, our strongest proscriptions – as against murder – are both immoral and illegal. In any case, along with etiquette, it will be norms of morality and legality that will be my object in this chapter.

As in my appeal to cases in the previous volume, I make no claim here that the cases I am assembling are exhaustive or even necessarily the most important of their kind. They are at least important changes in the ways we morally and legally conduct ourselves and consequently understand who we are. These changes, I group as follows:

- Etiquette
- The Secular Revolution
- Human Rights
- Racial Civil Rights
- The Women's Movement
- The LGBTQ Movement

To get some overall handle on these changes, let us imagine ourselves at the beginning of the twentieth century. At that time, automotive transport was still a rarity, and the telephone was just coming into wider public use. Etiquette manuals instructed men to hold doors open for women, who did not have the vote and whose exclusion from many sources of employment effectively subordinated them to men (fathers or husbands) in much the manner earlier of Jane Austen's novels.

Rudyard Kipling had just penned *The White Man's Burden* to commemorate the American conquest of the Philippines, and much of the world still resided in colonies. In the United States, polite society called African Americans "colored" for fear of offending with the word black. In much of the country, those so designated

were restricted to their own restaurants, water fountains, and rest rooms. In the American south, lynchings were common. Other kinds of prejudice, such as anti-Semitism, abounded throughout the world, expressed in ethnic jokes and much worse.

Throughout the countries of the West, divorce was rare and legally restricted. Full rights to divorce did not come to England until the Matrimonial Causes Act of 1973. In the United States, it was only 1969 that California became the first state to pass a no-fault divorce law. People married early, and single girls found pregnant were either married or shipped off for abortions, which, in the United States was only widely legalized by the Supreme Court in the *Roe v. Wade* decision of 1973. The word queer had just come into vogue as a designation for homosexuality, the practice of which, several decades earlier had come to be called “the love that dare not speak its name.” Indeed, Oscar Wilde had issued his *Ballad of Reading Gaol*, commenting on his imprisonment in England for gross indecency.

The Scopes “Monkey” Trial was still 14 years in the future, but a Christian fundamentalist reaction to growing secular humanism was already brewing. It would be another 60 years before Roman Catholics would experience the reforms of Vatican II, and the U.S. presidential election of John F. Kennedy in 1960 was made problematic by widespread suspicion that as a Catholic, Kennedy would take orders from Rome.

Europe and the United States were industrialized, and factory-based industry constituted a major source of employment. Social democracy was strong in Europe, and even in the United States, the American Federation of Labor had been around already for 15 years. However, family farming as well still claimed over 40 % of the labor force.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, there was no United Nations, nor even a League of Nations. Instead, as Wight (2015) tells us in his paper, nations confronted each other in what was virtually an anarchic state of nature, punctuated at most by shifting alliances. There was international trade, but nowhere of the dimensions we now associate with globalization. Instead, in many countries for many industries, tariff protections remained. National publics were insular. While now, about one third of Americans hold passports, as late as 1990, that figure was under 3 %. Even now, foreign news attracts much less attention among Americans than domestic matters. The isolation was even greater before.

Before the mid-twentieth century, there was no universal talk of human rights. The basic concept goes back at least as far as the *Magna Carta* and, in the modern period, was popularized first in the form of the natural rights spoken of by the British social contract theorists and the *philosophes* of the French enlightenment. Both the American and French revolutions were founded on this basis. In the nineteenth century, the establishment of the *International Committee of the Red Cross* and the first of the Geneva Conventions did broach the subject at an international level. Yet it was not until after the two world wars that human rights talk became more hegemonic in the modern world system.

With this contextual background behind us, let us turn to what are at least some of the great normative transformations of the twentieth century. We begin with what is perhaps mostly symptomatic of deeper transformations: Changes in Etiquette.

Changes in Etiquette

Etiquette may not be the most profound of the norms that bind us, but the rules that constitute it are perhaps most pervasive in our lives and hence reflective of multiple social dimensions. Dealing with both self-presentation and deference to others, etiquette was a focus of study by Goffman (1963) and before him by Elias (1978), who even more specifically was concerned with the great transformations in etiquette that resulted in our modern sensibility.

How do we study etiquette and changes in it? Goffman examined etiquette manuals, as of course did Elias. We are fortunate now to have a new study in such a vein by Seth Abrutyn and Michael Carter (2014), who compare the first (1922), the fifth (1937), and the eighteenth (2011) editions of Emily Post's etiquette manuals.

Abrutyn and Carter are specifically concerned with what they consider a decline of Durkheimian collective consciousness in America, by which they mean a loss of firm moral consensus at the level of manners. This breakdown, they demonstrate, shows up in the etiquette manuals. What Abrutyn and Carter track in effect is a growing heterogeneity over the course of the twentieth century in American culture.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, Abrutyn and Carter argue, the etiquette manuals portrayed American culture as a single, monolithic whole, epitomized by the American upper class. As was the case for Erasmus's *Handbook on Manners for Children* studied by Elias, the etiquette manuals of the early twentieth century were perused by those anticipating upward mobility. The norms the manuals advanced were not, however, depicted relativistically as just the ways of a particular class, however, dominant, but, as in the moral realism of Erasmus's rulebook, as the objectively proper way all civilized beings should comport themselves.

Implicitly, then, those at the top of the hierarchy were conceived as upholding that which was objectively right, what befits "the long, slow progress of social intercourse in the upward climb of man from the primeval state" (Post 1922: 6; Abrutyn and Carter 2014: 9). Accordingly, in contrast with the 18th edition of the manual, the first edition, consistent with the treatise of Erasmus, focuses on the shame occasioned by very particular transgressions. Strong adverbs of frequency – *always* and *never* – are much more frequently employed in the first than in the 18th edition. Thus, "the groom's presents to his ushers are always put at their places at the bachelor dinner" (Post 1922: 233; Abrutyn and Carter 2014: 12). Similarly, "the hostess never leaves her post" (Post 1922: 180; Abrutyn and Carter 2014: 12).

There is over time likewise a diminution in the strength of modal verbs. Abrutyn and Carter (2014: 14) observe that *must* appears over 500 times in the first edition as in "one inexorable rule of etiquette is that you must talk to your next door neighbor at a dinner table" (Post 1922: 155). In contrast, the 18th edition uses the word *must* only 65 times. Instead, the 18th edition favors the weaker modal, *should*. With growing tentativeness about the particular, what Abrutyn and Carter notice more generally between manuals, is a growing abstraction in what etiquette is deemed to be about. As the 18th edition puts it, "Being considerate, respectful, and honest is more important than knowing which fork to use" (Post et al. 1937/2011; Abrutyn and Carter 2014: 9).

The 18th edition is further distinguished by attention to the emergent forms of interaction occasioned by new technology. Thus, there is advice on how to “unfriend” someone on Facebook; when and how to use a cell phone in public; and online dating (Abrutyn and Carter 2014: 8, 17).

Abrutyn and Carter (2014: 10) further observe a decline in gender differences between the first and 18th editions. At my own expense, Archer will be amused to hear that according to the 18th edition, for a gentleman, “it is still inappropriate to wear a hat in a house.” On the other hand, the 18th edition makes no special note of hat tipping in deference to women. Hat tipping or removal is rather described as a sign of respect to any other, male or female (Abrutyn and Carter 2014: 10). Providing some vindication for me, however, Abrutyn and Carter cite a section from Dresser’s (2005) etiquette manual entitled, “Hats Off – Not!” which observes how fluid hat rules have become. Yea!

How do we explain the observed transformations in the rules of etiquette? Following the morphogenetic/morphostatic (MM) approach (see Archer 1995), to which most of us in these volumes subscribe, the changes seem largely although not totally unintended consequences of actions in changing contexts pursued for other or larger purposes. Certainly, the rules arising around new digital technologies are occasioned by those new technologies themselves, which present new social dilemmas for actors to negotiate. In Marxian terms, a change in the material infrastructure led to a change in the cultural superstructure.

Other changes in etiquette – and certainly their greater fluidity today – reflect deeper structural changes, in particular the diminished hegemony of once dominant WASP sensibility. With the civil rights movement, the women’s movement and so on, multiculturalism has become a core social value and with it a greater acknowledgement of at least a degree of relativism, that there often is no single right way of conducting oneself, that proper conduct may vary from subculture to subculture.

The growing abstractness Abrutyn and Carter observe in the understanding of etiquette itself seems to signal a second cycle of a morphogenetic process. It can be understood, that is, as an agentic response to the structural and cultural changes wrought by a previous cycle as the abstraction seems an attempt to recapture coherence across the fragmentation produced by previous changes.

The Secular Revolution

I once knocked back on her heels a very good, atheistic student. When I asked her from whence she derived her morals, she replied it is all common sense. What gave this student pause was my counter suggestion that what she was calling common sense was the cultural legacy of Judaism and Christianity. I continue to think this assessment correct: Regardless of one’s religious belief, most of us in the West inherit our morality from religion, which is not to say we could not have arrived at the same moral place via other routes. Still, given the close tie between religion and morality, I consider the secular revolution here.

The Secular Revolution may seem an odd phrase. Going back to Comte and perhaps before, secularization has been thought by social scientists to represent a natural process, captured by what has been called the “secularization thesis,” the thesis that, with modernization, religion will inevitably fade away. Although there have been multiple factors expected to lead toward this end, among them certainly have been liberal enlightenment culture and the growth of science.

In contrast with that account, *The Secular Revolution* is a collection of essays edited by Christian Smith (2003) arguing that secularity in the twentieth century has been not entirely a natural process but also the political work of certain elites, such as the rising intelligentsia. Does my use of that title as a heading signal my support for this thesis? I do think the thesis true, but I adopted the heading for another reason that I will explain shortly.

The whole secularization thesis is currently up in the air as Phil Gorski and Altınordu Ates (2008) tell us in a great piece in the *Annual Review of Sociology* and on which I draw in this section. Whereas it once was almost taken for granted, then disputed and slated for rejection, the secularization thesis is now being rethought in more complex and sophisticated ways.

To introduce some of the complications, over the long debate about it, understanding of secularization has varied. Is it a macro-thesis about the withdrawal of religion from large-scale societal functions or a similarly macro-level decline in religious authority and discourse? Alternately, is it rather a more micro-level thesis about the fading of religious consciousness among individuals? If the latter, given that religiosity is a multidimensional quality, has religiosity faded equally along all dimensions? Here Gorski and Ates warn against what they call an overly pastoral view of the question, which emphasizes practices associated with collective worship. Those practices might decline, they say, without a similar decline in religious belief or religious ethical practice. As there is in other words what Davie (1994) termed “believing without belonging,” it may well be that it is only organized religion that is in decline and not religion per se.

Of course, as Gorski and Ates further say, we are not even quite sure how religious people were along all dimensions in the past so that it is difficult to say over the *longue durée* whether what we observe today is a cyclical slump or a secular decline. Certainly, Gorski and Ates show, the pace of any decline in religiosity has varied across space and time and been given – locally at least – to periodic reversals.

Fortunately, for our purposes here, we can sidestep many of these issues. In the first place, taking the advice of Gorski and Ates, we can distinguish between secularization per se and de-Christianization. Whether or not there has been an overall decline in religiosity along certain dimensions, there is more agreement that there has been such decline specifically in Christianity.

Second, however non-uniform religious decline may have been across the *longue durée*, there is much more consensus, Gorski and Ates tell us, that there has been a sharp decline in Christianity within the period on which I focus, that is, the twentieth century. The decline has been particularly noticeable in Britain and the United States, the latter long-noted for its historically high rates of religious observance. Some of the fall-off in the United States has been fairly recent. In particular, over

the past 20 years, the percentage of the religiously unaffiliated in the United States, what are sometimes called “the nones,” has doubled, now comprising 16 % of the population (Pew 2012). Membership decline in mainline Protestant denominations has been particularly steep but now seems also to be affecting Evangelical churches. The United States would also show drastic drops in Catholic membership were it not for a steady influx of Catholic immigrants.

Throughout the twentieth century, there have been other periods of sudden Christian decline in both America and Britain. There have been, for example, such declines after both world wars. In Britain, Callum Brown (2001) attributes another such drop to the 1960s counter-culture, which also seems to have had like effect in the United States.

I borrowed the phrase *Secular Revolution*, I can now say, to refer to this sudden de-Christianization (and, seemingly, also de-Judaization) in the twentieth century, but the question remains as to its cause. Has it been due to larger tectonic forces or to the deliberate agency of particular elites and movements? It seems both. As Gorski and Ates (2008: 61) suggest, along with non-agential forces of secularization, there have been agents who have actively tried to abet them, just as there have been non-agential forces operating against secularization and agents who have for their part tried to abet those counter-forces. We thus seem to have here a complex and fluid situation in which multiple mechanisms are operative and in which the outcomes reflect their momentary balance.

To bring this all back to our inquiry, what does such secularization have to do with moral change? I think two main things. The first relates to a complaint I have with introductory texts on the philosophy of ethics, about which I have written before (Porpora 2001; Porpora et al. 2013). My complaint is philosophers’ tendency to reduce religious ethics to what they call *divine command theory*. Divine command theory stipulates that religious people, oblivious to the *Euthyphro* dilemma, consider what they take to be moral as that which God commands, simply because they are God’s commands. Philosophers accordingly ignore alternate sources of religious morality, originating either in cosmogonic understandings of who we are in the universe (e.g., equal children of God) or in a divinized ideal of the good such as elucidated by Feuerbach (1989).

My complaint notwithstanding, it is likely that philosophers have tended to emphasize divine command theory because historically, theologians aside, divine command theory describes how common people have thought of morality. If so, then we might expect a modern decline in religious authority to result in a decline within the general population of the tendency think about morality as what God commands. In contrast, as blind obedience fades as a moral motivation, people look for more reasoned warrants for their moral principles and, not finding them, abandon those prescriptions that fail the test. We can thus see how we might have arrived in the twentieth century with what has been called the *permissive society* with all that label entails: The sexual revolution; free love; use of artificial contraception; abortion rights; gay rights; etc.

Further, as divine command theory fades in purchase, so does, among the general population, any *deontological* approach to ethics. In its stead, consistent with the

general trend toward instrumental rationality (see Weber 2012; Horkheimer and Adorno 2007) is a greater reliance on the logic of moral utilitarianism. Indeed, the work of Jonathan Haidt (e.g., 2013) seems positively to equate moral rationality with moral utilitarianism. We thus arrive at a point where in America, even torture comes to be discussed – at least in the secular arena – entirely in terms of moral utility (Porpora et al. 2013).

I could continue with the above line of thought, but we must move on. As I wrote in our previous volume, a second consequence, I believe, of the demise of religious authority or of religious discourse is a loss of moral grounding (see also Porpora 2001; Taylor 1992). Simply put, the variety of ways in which religion once grounded morality has not been adequately replaced. Thus, while we may retain as legacy the morality of our religions, we find we are without the resources now to justify that morality. Thus, along with the loss of a fuller moral vocabulary (Bellah et al. 2007; Luckmann 1997; Porpora et al. 2013), we get a postmodernist swing (hardly just among intellectuals) toward moral relativism.

The Human Rights Movement

We observe now worldwide a full-fledged human rights culture or even what some have called a regime (Rabossi 1990; Dunn and Wheeler 1999). It encompasses lawyers, journalists, politicians, and the public (Nickel 2007). It is enshrined in such international accords as the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, and the subsequent declarations of political, social and economic rights. Worldwide, wrongs are opposed and heeded in the name of human rights. Human rights are spoken of even by those who oppose or transgress human rights when defending themselves in international opinion.

Human rights talk thus represents a salutary and remarkable discursive hegemony. How did we get here? One lesson of the human rights movement is that change can take a long time. Although the roots of rights talk can be traced back even further, we can certainly find their cosmogonic origin in Judaism and Christianity as we saw, in the opening lines of Thomas Jefferson's *Declaration of Independence*: "All men are endowed by their creator with certain inalienable rights."

Jefferson's reflections were part of a trend. Human rights talk was generally bolstered during the eighteenth century enlightenment by the writings of the social contract thinkers, most notably John Locke, who influenced Jefferson, and, some (see Hunt 2008) argue, by the growth of the novel, through which people developed greater empathy for each other. Then, along with the American Revolution, which made Jefferson's words famous, there was the French Revolution, considered one of the pivotal moments in the development of a modernist sensibility (Mayer 2002), that featured the "rights of man."

We can think of cultural milieux as the result of iterated morphogenetic cycles building on each other. Thus, building on a diffuse moral climate in which the

concept of rights was coming into focus, there were already in the nineteenth century organized social movements that much more intentionally promoted human rights. These constituted the kind of norm entrepreneurs of which Wight speaks in his chapter. Chief among them was the movement led by Henry Dunant that in 1863 established the *International Committee of the Red Cross*. Although today we think of the *Red Cross* mainly in terms of disaster relief, its efforts led to the first Geneva Convention in 1864.

Another three Geneva Conventions followed in the twentieth century, the fourth convention after World War II in 1949. Further and most prominently, the charter of the United Nations (UN) affirms the “dignity and worth of the human person” and in 1948, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). A major reason for the UDHR was the world’s horror at the Holocaust and a felt need by UN member states that the articulated concern for human rights in the UN charter was insufficiently strong.

Both the UN and the UDHR were instruments of world leaders, particularly Franklin Roosevelt, who sought a successor to the *League of Nations*, and his wife, Eleanor, who chaired the commission that drafted the UDHR. Here, then, we observe agency as well, but it is not agency at a grassroots level but rather of a structurally highly placed sort.

For all its contemporary importance, the concept of human rights reflects the problem I identified at the end of the last section. As political theorist Jack Donnelly (2002) says, human rights rest on a social decision to act as if they exist. But are human rights simply a reification? On what foundation does all our talk of human rights rest?

For some, like Michael Ignatieff (2003), ignoring the question of foundations is a pragmatic decision. It is enough for Ignatieff that we agree on what is right or good. No need to reach agreement on why we agree. I doubt that Ignatieff is right, but that dispute is an issue for another time. Our space here permits only our notice of how currently without foundation is secular talk of human rights.

The Black Civil Rights Movement in America

In 1909, sociologist W.E.B. Du Bois joined with other black activists to form the *National Association for the Advancement of Colored People* (NAACP), several co-founders of which were Jewish. Jews in particular gave the NAACP much support.

One of the principal victories for the NAACP came in 1954 with the Supreme Court decision in *Brown v. Board of Education* against the racial segregation of public schools. Closely following in 1955, Rosa Parks refused to relinquish her seat to whites on a public bus. Parks, it should be noted, was not just an isolated individual, irate at injustice. Irate she was, but she was also secretary of the Montgomery Alabama chapter of the NAACP and had been trained in non-violent resistance at the *Highlander Center* in Tennessee (where I also was excited to spend

a day training for service learning). The struggle against racial injustice was thus an instance in which social change was agentially motored intentionally from below by grassroots social movements.

And prominent among the change agents in that movement was religion (as it was also, it might be said, in India and South Africa). I have already mentioned the strong involvement of Jews in the American civil rights movement. Prominent as well were churches, particularly the Black Protestant Church. If the protest of Rosa Parks culminated one morphogenetic cycle against past injustice, her arrest began another. In response to Parks's arrest, local black ministers, among them Ralph Abernathy and Martin Luther King, organized what became the *Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC)* to lead a boycott of city buses. In December 1956, the boycott led to a federal ruling in U.S. district court – *Browder v. Gayle* – declaring segregation on Alabama buses unconstitutional.

As Doug McAdam (2012; see also Wikipedia 2014) has observed, however, there was not just one civil rights movement but multiple. Along with *NAACP* and *SCLC*, there was the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (*SNCC*) and the Congress on Racial Equality (*CORE*), which together formed the “big four” civil rights organizations.

It was not, however, all just grassroots social movement efforts. As indicated, U.S. federal courts played a large role as did the executive branch of the government. Roosevelt had hosted Booker T. Washington in the White House, and Eisenhower in 1957 sent troops to enforce de-segregation in Little Rock, Arkansas. Among other things, under John F. Kennedy, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy sent federal marshals to Alabama to protect the *Freedom Riders*. In 1965, President Lyndon Johnson signed the *Voting Rights Act* into effect. Thus, while the African American civil rights movement was largely an agentic struggle, like the human rights movement more generally, it involved actors in multiple positions of the social structure and, as Lazega (2015) reminds us in his paper, of actors tied to other actors in complex social networks.

Not only that. By the time of the Civil Rights Movement, 86 % of households had television. Thus, the 1963 March on Washington was the first event to be broadcast around the world (Al-Muslim 2014; Kashar 1996).

The Women's Movement

As *Wikipedia* tells us, the women's movement has included a whole range of issues: reproductive rights; domestic violence; maternity leave; equal pay, women's suffrage; sexual harassment; and sexual violence. At this point, there are different ways to tell this story. One, again, is to emphasize morphogenetic cycles and to see how the civil rights movement served as a precedent for the furthered rights of women.

Another way to tell the story is to highlight the role of economic and technological change. The economic changes have to do with what in the United States

became the postwar bust circa 1972. The bust was preceded by a boom. The United States had emerged from the Second World War without the internal destruction that afflicted most of the remaining industrialized world. Thus, the United States became a towering economic giant, supplying the world with industrialized goods. Accordingly, the United States exited the war not only free of lingering depression but also in a state of economic boom.

During the boom, a family could still be comfortably supported by a single income earner. Thus, it was a time when on American television series, husbands like Ralph Kramden could proclaim how a “man’s home is his castle” and oppose their wives going out to work. Women therefore generally remained economically dependent on their husbands.

For a variety of reasons, the boom ended around 1972 and since that time, with what regulation theorists (see, e.g., Jessop 2007) call a change in the *regime of accumulation*, wages in real dollars have stagnated. Over the initial protests of the developed world’s Ralph Kramdens, it became economically necessary for wives to enter the labor force. That entry exposed women to myriad injustices in the work place – from unequal pay to sexual harassment – and changed the power dynamics at home. Thus, here in M/M fashion, a change in material conditions would eventually result in deep cultural changes.

But normative changes were brewing from other sources as well, among them a constellation of forces or conjuncture tending toward what would become the permissive society. The erosion of religious taboos in the 1960s, particularly among the young, I have already mentioned. That effect was amplified, however, by a postwar baby boom that made the young the defining generation of the age, effecting a veritable youth culture. Simultaneously, partly because of the economic boom and partly due to other factors, college education was – at least in the United States – becoming not only much more widely accessible but among the middle and upper middle class increasingly normative.

That development in turn pushed up the age of marriage, resulting in a growing normative acceptance of pre-marital sex. Whereas even in the past pre-marital sex may have been practiced more widely than acknowledged, births out of wedlock were societally unacceptable. As the development of the pill in 1960 greatly reduced that possibility, the cultural impulse toward permissiveness was bolstered. The greater sexual freedom for both men and women led in its turn to further changes in relations across the sexes, resulting simultaneously both in greater female empowerment and further female exploitation.

As women entered the workforce, they came to imagine themselves not just as wives and mothers but also as teachers, lawyers, physicians and pursuers of other careers. The multiplicity of female roles on offer made scheduling reproduction problematic in a way it had not been before. Women saw themselves in possession of the right to decide how and when to reproduce. That shift coincided with a new uncertainty within the medical profession, which in the wake of the Thalidomide controversy, was no longer sure about the boundary between therapeutic and criminal abortion. The result was that abortion was transformed from a question that was narrowly medical to one that was broadly political (Luker 1985).

That result was again not just a natural occurrence. The *Zeitgeist* in this direction was nurtured by normative entrepreneurs who organized female “consciousness-raising groups,” which in turn, echoing what C. Wright Mills (1970) termed the *sociological imagination*, proclaimed “the personal is political.” That principle would extend beyond the issue of reproduction to such issues as workload within the home and equal pay outside. And ultimately here too we have to do not just with agency at a grassroots level but ultimately at the highest political levels as well as with the U.S. Supreme Court decision *Roe v. Wade*. Academia also played its role with a burst of academic feminist work that made its way into popular culture.

As brought home by accounts of gang rape on American university campuses, the fight for women’s equality is far from over. The fight so far has nevertheless had broad cultural ramifications, not just in redefining womanhood but in the process of contributing to a fundamental postmodern destabilization of what it means to have and to represent a self-identity. That destabilization in what is most central to us is centrally at issue in the final change we will consider.

The LGBTQ Movement

With the LGBTQ movement we are dealing centrally with what Maccarini (2016) describes as norm neutralization or *denormalization*. In particular it is the disappearance of the stigmas attached to non-normative sexuality that we are witnessing. As the very acronym suggests, the LGBTQ movement is an amalgam of lesbians, gays, bisexuals, transgendered folk – and now with the Q – even those just questioning how they wish to identify. The questioning itself is significant on three counts. First, as I suggested just above, it signals the destabilization in our idea of the self, first inaugurated by the women’s movement but carried further by so-called *Queer* theory and readings of Foucault that have lent so much to what still remains of a postmodern sensibility. It is a sensibility that reduces the ontology of selfhood to less coherent phenomenology (see Porpora 2015).

There is unfortunately no space to expand much on the previous cryptic statement except to note its bearing on the second and third ways the Q is significant. The second way is that much of the movement has to do with challenging the normativity of human classifications and the way they putatively stifle certain personal identities. As important as that question is, however, it has been posed within Queer theory in a way that reduces selves to how they experience themselves, so if someone experiences herself as multiple, then she actually is multiple ontologically. The problem with that account, as I have argued elsewhere (Porpora 2001, 2015), is that, morally our care extends to the single self that confronts us as a Thou in Buber’s (1971) sense and not to a legion of Lacanian subject positions. My fear then with Queer theorization is its destabilization and dislocation of the object of moral concern.

The third way the Q is important is that it signifies the postmodern political instability that extends even to the LGBTQ movement itself. The fact is that gays in particular are not wont to accept the bisexual identity, seeing in it rather a failure to commit to a wholly gay identity.

Wikipedia helpfully informs us that as in the case of other movements we have canvassed, the roots of the LGBTQ movement go way back with even Jeremy Bentham in the United Kingdom arguing along utilitarian lines that as a victimless crime, homosexual relations should be legalized. It was long after, however, before such movement bore much fruit. Thus, as has now been popularized by the movie, *The Imitation Game*, as late as 1952, Alan Turing was arrested for homosexual relations conducted within his own home.

If the LGBTQ movement emerged with new force thereafter, it was in the United States due partly to the riots at the Stonewall Inn in Greenwich Village, New York and partly to the way in which the AIDS crisis both reinvigorated activism and greater public empathy for the gay community (Altman 1988). In both cases, the gay and lesbian movement built on the precedence of earlier rights movements and in turn served as yet another precedent for the extension of the movement to bisexuals, the transgendered, and the questioning. We thus again have chains of M/M cycles, crowned finally by action at higher political levels.

Conclusions

Let us begin with how far we have come. Today, in the United States, no longer do we refer to black people as colored. Although racism is still definitely with us, at the same time it no longer is unusual to see racially mixed couples kissing – or more – on television. Compared with 1900, the television itself is new as are home and hand-held computers and the Internet. Not only do we regularly see racially mixed couples on television but also now openly gay and lesbian figures. In the United States and Europe both abortion and divorce are widely legal. Western Europe now is very de-Christianized, and Christianity appears to be weakening even in the United States. The world has now been largely decolonized, fostering a postmodern post-colonial discourse in the academy. Worldwide, we have experienced a process that Carrigan (2016) calls “communicative escalation,” fostered by the Internet and globalization. We also have a United Nations and a worldwide regime of human rights – at least in terms of talk.

How did we get here? Whatever contribution this paper makes comes from juxtaposition, from, that is, comparing all the capsule narratives side-by-side to abstract some general elements of normative change. There are a few such common elements I want to propose. First, normative changes are complex phenomena, involving multiple mechanisms. Certainly, they involve human agency – in some respects intentional and in some unintentional. The agency involved, moreover, is multiply placed. At the grassroots level, it involves what may begin as isolated

norm entrepreneurs who combine forces to form social movement organizations. The successful movements, however, eventually involve changes in formal rules that come from the higher placed agency of government officials. So agency is involved in different ways at different structural levels.

From Al-Amoudi's (2016) paper we gain an interesting insight on the nature of that agency. Al-Amoudi reminds us of Wittgenstein's point that the articulation of rules must always come to an end and beyond that we are left with unarticulated interpretation. That unarticulated background of interpretation forms the reservoir out of which rules are extended, transformed, transcended and otherwise reinterpreted and reformulated.

Along those lines, we see repeatedly not just within each individual narrative but also across them chains of M/M cycles, ways particularly in which one movement's success becomes a precedent for another's evolution. There has been in particular a building from human rights in general to racial civil rights specifically and from there (as well as from other sources) to women's rights and from women's rights (again from other sources as well) to the expanded rights relating to lesbians and gays, to bisexuals and the transgendered.

Contexts consist of both cultural and structural features. We observed, for example, purely cultural elements that rule certain social placements for women or people of color or the transgendered. A placement, however, has meaning only relative to other placements to which it is related. Thus, the cultural rulings as to placement immediately establish structural relations that confront actors as objective givens.

Among the givens we have encountered in the narratives have been unjust relations; technological changes – such as the pill or reproductive technologies – that altered relations; and changes in the capitalist order such as those that have weakened the economic viability of the family unit, which in turn also altered relations among family members. The givens also include certain cultural latencies in religion – liberationist latencies already there in the culture (see Archer 1988) waiting to be drawn on by religious social movements.

Other cultural elements involved in the narratives take diverse forms. I spoke above of latencies, of elements of culture that for a long time go unattended without thereby disappearing from the cultural stock. In some cases, these elements take the form of deep sensibilities, what Reed (2011) considers parts of broad, historically specific cultural landscapes. Such landscapes take a long time to develop and to breakout, if they do at all, in a strong sense of *Zeitgeist*. We saw that before human rights would become the object of a concerted movement, it was preceded by a long gestation period during which a certain cultural sensibility was established. It was only against that landscape, arguably, that the intentional movements could succeed.

In our annual face-to-face Workshops multiple participants asked me to say something about where in the end I thought we are moving morally. Archer in particular asked me to comment on what I (Porpora et al. 2013) recently termed the macro-moral disconnect. The macro-moral disconnect is how my colleagues and I recently termed a general failure of both individuals and of public discourse to address macro-moral matters – like war, torture, the use of drones – in moral terms,

the tendency instead to reframe moral considerations in terms of prudential considerations. Certainly, that tendency coincides with the general tendency toward norm neutralization Maccarini (2016) cites and the tendency toward purely instrumental regulations observed by Archer (2016).

Part of what is going on was suggested by Donati (2016) and Gorski (2016). Donati speaks of a move away from deontological forms of morality in favor of pure moral utility and cites as an example the recommendation of the Ethical Council of the German Federal Government to decriminalize incest. It is almost as if the council were taking its advice from Haidt, who, as noted, symptomatically seems to equate moral rationality exclusively with a logic of moral utility. It is a logic my colleagues and I also saw operating in the American debate on torture that ensued after the revelations from Abu Ghraib. In the elite liberal press, the argument was either framed in purely prudential terms – whether or not torture works – or, if left as a moral issue then approached almost exclusively in the moral utilitarian terms of the ticking bomb – one tortured terrorist versus a million dead citizens. My colleagues and I found that one had to go to the religious press – both left and right – to find the appeals to human sanctity that might contend with utility.

I speak here as in the last volume very deliberately of a liberal sensibility. Maccarini asked in discussion whether what I am describing applies just to the West. I do not think so, but I also do not think it applies to the West as a whole. Rather I agree with Hofkirchner's (2016) suggestion that there is developing worldwide a global cosmopolitan conscience.

Hofkirchner opposes this global cosmopolitanism to what he calls a contrasting culture of moral indifference, but I actually think the two interpenetrate. The reason is that the morality of cosmopolitan culture tends to be exceedingly thin. Not only does it tend, as Donati (2016) suggests, to abandon deontological logic, but as Donati further suggests – and Gorski (2016) with him, its tendency is so to valorize personal freedom and autonomy that respect and tolerance become its cardinal virtues. Of course respect and tolerance are to be commended, but not everything – torture, for example, should be tolerated. Thus, Donati warns against what he calls the *Foucault Trap*, where personal autonomy itself becomes a mechanism of oppression. I think it a warning worth heeding.

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